Putting Frist On A Diet

One of the weaknesses of Fristianity is also one of its strengths. The many different versions of Fristianity can make it difficult to grasp and answer. Fristianity proponents might exclaim that this difficulty is the whole point. There are a number of problems with this response. If Fristianity is no different from general objections concerning the impossibility of the contrary then it is superfluous. Similarly, if Fristianity is no different from various other objections concerning presuppositionalism in general and TAG in particular then it is superfluous. Finally, the different versions of Fristianity are often essentially different from each other rather than just insignificant variations on the same underlying objection in the form of a possible worldview.

If Fristianity is to be taken seriously as an objection it must be clearly defined. Yet there have been as many different objections to TAG labeled “Fristianity” as there have been knee-jerk reactions loaded with rhetoric pointed at Fristianity proponents. (Though amusingly I had a gentleman who insisted that the possible worldview he presented me with which had four, five, six, etc. persons in one god was not the Fristianity objection!) Is Fristianity the same thing as the claim that TAG is an inductive argument? Is Fristianity the same thing as the appeal to mystery allegedly available to adherents of other supposed revelatory worldviews? Is Fristianity the same thing as the ‘apologetic mirror’ objection? Is Fristianity the same thing as the question of what the ‘Christian worldview’ is comprised of? Is Fristianity the same thing as the question of what the canon is comprised of? Is Fristianity actual or possible? Is Fristianity an argument or a worldview? Answering any of these questions puts one in the awkward position of having to explain why knowledgeable Fristianity proponents have elsewhere answered differently. Contradictory answers to the aforementioned questions presuppose that the Fristian objection has been made plain on numerous occasions yielding fundamentally incompatible versions of Fristianity.